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Constitutional Intelligence: Restoring
Politics in the War on Terror
Roger Pilon
We are invited in this symposium to draw lessons from
Lincoln’s constitutionalism for today’s War on Terror—and on
this panel to consider whether a wartime decline in civil liberties
can be justified by a gain of civil rights. As an initial matter, let
me suggest that the distinction between civil liberties and civil
rights is less than conspicuous.
Notwithstanding Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld’s efforts in the 1913 and 1917 Yale Law
Journal to distinguish rights, powers, privileges, and
immunities—all of which could be reduced to rights, he
concluded—I have never been persuaded that a clear contrast
between the two could be drawn, other than nominally.1
Accordingly, I will take the basic questions before us to be:
Do we at times give up a measure of liberty for a measure of
security?
And should we?
Those questions take us to
fundamental moral, political, and legal principles. And the
answers to both, I submit, are yes—at times we do and we should
sacrifice a measure of liberty for a greater measure of security.
Thus, Benjamin Franklin was as wrong when he said that those
who would sacrifice liberty for security deserve neither,2 even if
that is sometimes true, as when he said that “there never was a
good war or a bad peace.”3 History, of course, is replete with
peace agreements that have led only to future wars.4

This is a revised version of remarks delivered at a symposium on “Lincoln’s
Constitutionalism in Time of War: Lessons for the War on Terror,” Chapman University
School of Law, Jan. 30, 2009.
Vice President for Legal Affairs; Director, Center for Constitutional Studies, Cato
Institute. The views expressed here are my own, not those of the Cato Institute.
1 WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN
JUDICIAL REASONING (Walter Wheeler Cook ed.) (photo. reprint 2002) (1946) (Originally
in 1913 and 1917 Yale Law Journal).
2 HISTORICAL REVIEW OF PENNSYLVANIA 289 (1812) (attributed to Jackson and
Franklin but disowned by Franklin according to World Cat) (“Those who would give up
essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.”).
3 Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Sir Joseph Banks (July 27, 1783), in JARED
SPARKS, THE WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 547 (1882).
4 See, e.g., 12 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 331 (15th ed. 2002) (discussing
how the Treaty of Versailles led to an upsurge in German militarism, fostered deep
resentment, and encouraged future German aggression).
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I. LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTIONAL LEGACY
Abraham Lincoln understood those questions. But if one
takes some of the things he did during the Civil War out of
context, it is easy to fault him, as many have. Early in the war,
for example, he suspended the writ of habeas corpus, a power the
Constitution seems to reserve to Congress under limited
circumstances,5 but look at the context.
In brief, having participated in the election of 1860 and lost,
all but four of the southern states that would soon form the
Confederacy seceded from the Union and began seizing federal
property in the South.6 After his inauguration in March of 1861,
Lincoln was initially prepared to live with the situation.7 But
when he sought to resupply Fort Sumter, a beleaguered island
garrison in Charleston Bay that had remained in Union hands,
Confederate forces began firing on the fort before the supply
ships could arrive.8 Two days later the men at the fort
surrendered.9 Northern reaction was intense.10 When Lincoln
called up 75,000 volunteers, the four remaining southern states,
including Virginia, joined the Confederacy.11
Soon after, Lincoln’s focus shifted to Maryland when
northern troops traveling to Washington by rail were attacked by
a mob in Baltimore.12 With southern sympathies running high in
Maryland, and Virginia now firmly in the Confederacy, Lincoln
feared that the capital of the Union would soon be isolated, so he
ordered the writ of habeas corpus suspended along any “military
line” between Philadelphia and Washington.13 Notwithstanding
the placement of the Suspension Clause in Article I, the
Constitution is silent, of course, about who has the power to
suspend the writ.14 More to the point here, however, Congress
was not in session and would not again be in session until July

WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 22–25, 36 (1998).
JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 264, 267,
271, 273 (1988) [hereinafter “MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM”]; JAMES M.
MCPHERSON, TRIED BY WAR: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF 9 (2008)
[hereinafter “MCPHERSON, TRIED BY WAR”].
7 MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM, supra note 6, at 262–64.
8 Id. at 264, 267, 271, 273.
9 Id. at 273–74.
10 Id. at 274–75.
11 See MCPHERSON, TRIED BY WAR, supra note 6, at 22; MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF
FREEDOM, supra note 6, at 280.
12 MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM, supra note 6, at 285.
13 REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 20–25.
14 “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when
in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9,
cl. 2.
5
6
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4.15 When Congress finally did convene, it ratified a number of
Lincoln’s wartime actions, but it would be another two years
before it ratified this and Lincoln’s later, broader suspension of
habeas corpus.16
In the meantime, Chief Justice Roger Taney, sitting as a
United States circuit judge for the District of Maryland, tried to
thwart Lincoln’s habeas suspension;17 but Lincoln ignored
Taney’s order to bring one John Merryman before the court,
famously asking Congress, “[Are] all the laws, but one [i.e.,
habeas corpus], to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to
pieces, lest that one be violated?”18 Three years later, Lincoln
would reflect on his action with an analogy:
Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet preserve the constitution?
By general law life and limb must be protected, yet often a limb must
be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a
limb. I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become
lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the
constitution through preservation of the nation.19

Thus, Lincoln understood that the Constitution is not a
suicide pact.20 Our Constitution, in particular, vests powers
flexibly enough to protect both security and liberty, as the
circumstances warrant. But that becomes clear only if one is
clear about the first principles of the matter, which is where I
want now to turn.
I will begin by briefly setting forth the general theory or
framework. Within that framework I will then look, again
briefly, at one crucial element of the current War on Terror—the
gathering of foreign intelligence—leaving other elements of the
war to others on the panel. As revealed by the New York Times
on December 16, 2005,21 based on information leaked by a Justice
Department official with a top secret Sensitive Compartmented

15 At that time in our history, Congress normally met in December of the year after
the elections in even-numbered years. But several states held their congressional
elections only in the spring of odd-numbered years. As a result, Congress could not meet
in 1861 until all representatives had been elected. See MCPHERSON, TRIED BY WAR, supra
note 6, at 23–24.
16 See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755.
17 Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (Taney, C.J.).
18 Memorandum: Military Arrests, c. May 17, 1861, in WITH LINCOLN IN THE WHITE
HOUSE: LETTERS, MEMORANDA, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JOHN G. NICOLAY, 1860–1865,
430 (2000) (original emphasis); See also REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 38.
19 MCPHERSON, TRIED BY WAR, supra note 6, at 30 (original emphasis).
20 Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1257, 1257 (2004).
21 James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
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Information clearance,22 President George W. Bush launched the
“Terrorist Surveillance Program”23 shortly after the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, briefing eight key members of
Congress as he did so. Although the program was and still is
secret, in essence it was designed for gathering intelligence on
suspected terrorists by monitoring the electronic communications
of individuals outside the United States, even when those
communications travel through or involve persons in the United
States, and even when doing so would seem to violate the
strictures of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(FISA),24 which purports to provide the administration the
“exclusive” means for such monitoring. Finally, I will argue that
the administration’s various foreign intelligence-gathering
activities have been and continue to be not only legal but also
perfectly consistent with those background principles.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL BASICS: POWERS GRANTED, RIGHTS
RETAINED
Starting at the top, then, let me begin with the very function
of a constitution: in the American context, certainly, our
Constitution is the document through which “We the People of
the United States” authorized, instituted, empowered, and
limited the government we created through it. That places us
squarely in the individualist, state-of-nature tradition: the people
come together in the original position to give the government its
powers; the government does not give the people their rights—
they are born with those rights. That is the theory of the
Constitution’s Preamble. Before that, it was the theory of the
Declaration of Independence; and before that of John Locke, the
philosophical father of the nation.25

Michael Isikoff, The Fed Who Blew the Whistle, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 22, 2008, at 40.
President Bush first used the term “Terrorist Surveillance Program” publicly in a
Jan. 23, 2006 speech. See AP picks up White House's ‘terrorist surveillance program’
terminology, Media Matters for America, Feb. 9, 2006,
available at
http://mediamatters.org/items/200602090010 (last visited March 31, 2009). Because the
administration has modified its secret foreign intelligence gathering activities over time, I
will speak generically of those activities rather than use the term “Terrorist Surveillance
Program,” which seems to refer to the program that was in place from shortly after 9/11
until sometime after it was revealed to the public in December of 2005.
24 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(1978) (amended 2008). FISA has been amended several times, including by the FISA
Amendments Act of 2008, HR 6304, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008), signed
into law on July 10, 2008; The Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat.
552 (2007) (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006)), signed into law on August 5, 2007; and
the USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001), signed by President Bush
on October 26, 2001.
25 See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATIESES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1690) (discussing the origin and purpose of government).
22
23
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Too often, however, both libertarians and civil libertarians
focus only on the last of those constitutional functions—on the
limits on power—and understandably so. As Thomas Jefferson
observed, and history has amply demonstrated, “the natural
progress of things is for liberty to yield, and government to gain
ground.”26 But limits on government power are only one side of
the constitutional equation; grants of power are the other side,
and an undue focus on limits slights that side. The reason we
create government in the first place, after all, is to better protect
ourselves than we would be able to do, absent government, in the
state of nature—where life, Thomas Hobbes reminded us, is
“solitary, poore [sic], nasty, brutish, and short.”27
In a word, we came out of the state of nature for our own
safety.28 There are thus two rights at issue here, both held
against the government we created in the original position: the
right to privacy; and the prior right to be secure in our “lives,
liberties, and estates.”29 And no matter how finely one tries a
priori to calibrate the relation between the two, in a world of risk
and imperfect knowledge, there will be times a posteriori when
the calculus must be overridden and liberty must yield to
security. All of which is to say that an undue obsession with
overweening government can leave us exposed to the very threats
we created government to protect us from in the first place,
undermining the very purpose of government.
That much is elementary, of course, yet to listen to much of
the recent discourse one would think it had been utterly
forgotten. Thus, in the debate over the proper role of the
National Security Agency (NSA) in gathering foreign intelligence,
the critics’ obsession with privacy has all too often ignored the
calculus entailed in the trade-off between privacy and security.
On one hand, if the NSA intercepts your communications in an
effort to detect terrorist threats, you will not even know it, much
less be able to show an actionable harm.30 On the other hand, if
intelligence gathering is restricted out of an excessive concern for
privacy, the communications that precipitated 9/11 may very well
26 DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 3 (Univ.
Press of Va. 1994).
27 THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 89 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1996) (1651).
28 See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (Basic Books, Inc.
1974) (for a sophisticated discussion of the matter).
29 “And ’tis not without reason, that [man] seeks out, and is willing to joyn in
Society with others who are already united, or have mind to unite for the mutual
Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and Estates, which I call by the general Name,
Property.” LOCKE, supra note 25, § 123 at 350 (original emphasis).
30 In fact, it was for lack of standing that the Sixth Circuit dismissed the complaint
in ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 648, 653 (6th Cir. 2007).
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go undetected. The costs of erring on the side of security are
miniscule; while on the side of privacy they can be catastrophic,
as we have seen. Intelligence is the first line of defense in the
War on Terror. Without timely and adequate intelligence we are
defenseless, which is why this war cannot be fought using the
reactive, law enforcement model.31
III. EXECUTIVE DOMINANCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
But the Constitution hardly precludes that kind of costbenefit analysis. Nor is it insensitive to where in the government
the balance is best struck.
Through Article II, it vests
responsibility for the security of the nation, and hence for making
such calculations, primarily in the executive, whose power in such
matters is checked in limited ways by Congress, and in still more
limited ways by the judiciary, a pattern our history has
repeatedly demonstrated.32 Thus, it is no accident that when
Lincoln explained his actions to Congress he pointed to his oath
of office, which required him to “preserve, protect, and defend”
the Constitution, a duty that overrode any specific constitutional
constraints.33 And he added that the attack on Fort Sumter left
him with no choice “but to call out the war power of the
Government; and so to resist force, employed for its destruction,
by force, for its preservation.”34
That distribution of powers is perfectly consistent with our
theoretical foundations and our historical practices. Thus, Locke,
early on, speaks of the “Executive Power” as the power each of us
has in the state of nature to secure his rights.35 That is the main
power we yield up to government once we create it in the original
position, charging government to exercise it on our behalf. Later
on, once powers are separated—for better protection against
government—Locke speaks of the “Federative Power,” which the
executive exercises over foreign affairs.36 And about that power
he says, importantly, “it is much less capable to be directed by
antecedent, standing, positive Laws, than [by] the Executive; and

31 See generally, ANDREW C. MCCARTHY, WILLFUL BLINDNESS: A MEMOIR OF THE
JIHAD 51–58 (2008) (discussing the intelligence failures that have led to terrorist attacks
in the United States and the shortcomings of the law enforcement model for fighting
terrorism).
32 See JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 1–9 (2005); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The “Enemy Combatant”
Cases in Historical Context: The Inevitability of Pragmatic Judicial Review, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1005, 1020–23 (2007).
33 See Pushaw, supra note 32, at 1030–31 n.108.
34 MCPHERSON, TRIED BY WAR, supra note 6, at 24.
35 LOCKE, supra note 25, § 13, at 275–76.
36 Id. § 147–48, at 365–66.
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so must necessarily be left to the Prudence and Wisdom of those
whose hands it is in, to be managed for the publick [sic] good.”37
Likewise, Montesquieu, described by James Madison in
Federalist 47 as “the oracle who is always consulted”38 concerning
the separation of powers, writes of the Executive that he
“establishes the public security, and provides against
invasions.”39
And not just the theorists but experience too, under the
Articles of Confederation, had taught the Framers the folly of
legislative dominance in foreign affairs. Here, for example, is
Madison at the Constitutional Convention: “Experience had
proved a tendency in our governments to throw all power into the
Legislative vortex. The Executives of the States are in general
little more than Cyphers; the legislatures omnipotent.”40
Madison somewhat overstates the point, however. To be
sure, one of the main concerns at the Convention, and a principal
reason for urging a new constitution, was the lack under the
Articles of Confederation of a unified, forceful executive—
remember, the new nation was surrounded by three European
powers all stronger than itself.41 But experience in the states
was mixed. As Professor John Yoo has shown, the constitutions
of New York (1777), Massachusetts (1780), and New Hampshire
(1784) provided for relatively strong and successful executives.42
By contrast, Pennsylvania (1776), with its twelve-man executive
council, and South Carolina (1776), where the executive was all
but powerless absent express authority from the legislature,
offered models the Convention could have chosen but did not.43
Thus, it is no surprise that during the nation’s first year
under the new Constitution we find Madison writing, “[T]he
Executive power being in general terms vested in the President,
all powers of an Executive nature, not particularly taken away
must belong to that department.”44 And a year later, here is
Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, writing in an April 24,
1790 memorandum to President George Washington:
Id., § 147, at 366 (original emphasis).
THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, 11 THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151 (Thomas Nugent
trans., Hafner Pub. Co. 1949) (1748).
40 JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 312
(Adrienne Koch ed., Ohio Univ. Press 1966).
41 See YOO, supra note 32, at 68.
42 Id. at 67–68.
43 Id. at 63, 72–73.
44 Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (June 21, 1789), in 5 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 405–06 n. 1 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1904)
(1904) (emphasis added).
37
38
39
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The Constitution . . . has declared that ‘the Executive powers shall be
vested in the President,’ submitting only special articles of it to a
negative by the Senate . . . It belongs then to the head of that
department, except as to such portions of it as are specially submitted
to the Senate.45

And then he adds: “Exceptions are to be construed strictly”46—a
rare point of agreement between Jefferson and Alexander
Hamilton.
That balance, until very recently, has only been confirmed by
the great preponderance of cases, which hold that the foreign
affairs power belongs mainly to the executive, except as
specifically reserved. Reviewing recent scholarship that rejects
that view, Professor H. Jefferson Powell, who served in the Office
of Legal Counsel in the Clinton Justice Department, noted that
the problem for those “adopting the congressional-primacy view
is that one [must] repudiate or distinguish away most of what the
Supreme Court appears to have said on the subject.”47 To be
sure,
the
constitutional
text
is
considerably
more
underdetermined in foreign than in domestic affairs. But that
means only that theory, structure, history, and precedent loom
larger, and they all point to executive dominance in foreign
affairs.
IV. THE GATHERING OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
Turning, then, to the matter at hand, how does this brief
background shed light on the power to gather foreign
intelligence? I submit that the question here is not whether the
Bush administration’s foreign intelligence surveillance activities
amount to “warrantless wiretapping” in violation of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), for that would beg the
separation-of-powers question by presuming congressional
supremacy. Rather, to avoid that circularity, the questions at the
end of the day are whether FISA was wise and whether it is an
unconstitutional intrusion on the vested Article II power of the
president,48 and the two are closely connected.
Consider, as a preliminary matter, whether it was wise. Let
us start with the facts, and the overriding fact is that we do not

45 Jefferson’s Opinion on the Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplomatic
Appointments in 16 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 378–79 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1961)
(2000) (original emphasis).
46 Id.
47 H. Jefferson Powell, The Founders and the President’s Authority over Foreign
Affairs, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1471, 1472 (1999).
48 See Gary Lawson, What Lurks Beneath: NSA Surveillance and Executive Power,
88 B.U.L. REV. 375 (2008).
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know many of the facts. Foreign intelligence gathering is done in
secret, understandably, and the issues are technical. We are not
talking here about agents putting on headphones and going down
to the telephone company’s offices to clamp alligator clips on
copper wires.
The practical problem, however, is clear, and it was put well
by Judge Richard Posner, writing in the Wall Street Journal
shortly after the NSA surveillance story broke:
The administration is right to point out that FISA, enacted in 1978—
long before the danger of global terrorism was recognized and
electronic surveillance was transformed by the digital revolution—is
dangerously obsolete. It retains value as a framework for monitoring
the communications of known terrorists, but it is hopeless as a
framework for detecting terrorists. It requires that surveillance be
conducted pursuant to warrants based on probable cause to believe
that the target of surveillance is a terrorist, when the desperate need
is to find out who is a terrorist.49

Posner likened that task to looking for a needle in a haystack.50
But the technical problems surrounding FISA are more
daunting still. Professor K.A. Taipale, executive director of the
Center for Advanced Studies in Science and Technology Policy,
has summarized them as follows:
In modern networks, data and increasingly voice communications are
broken up into discrete packets that travel along independent routes
between point of origin and destination where these fragments are
then reassembled into the original whole message [“packet based”].
Not only is there no longer a dedicated circuit, but individual packets
from the same communication may take completely different paths to
their destination. To intercept these kinds of communications, filters
[“packet-sniffers”] and search strategies are deployed at various
communication nodes to scan and filter all passing traffic with the
hope of finding and extracting those packets of interest and
reassembling them into a coherent message. Even targeting a specific
message from a known sender requires intercepting (i.e., scanning
and filtering) the entire communication flow. Were FISA to be applied
strictly according to its terms prior to any “electronic surveillance” of
foreign communication flows passing through the US or where there
is a substantial likelihood of intercepting US persons, then no
automated monitoring of any kind could occur.51

49 Richard Posner, A New Surveillance Act, WALL STREET J., Feb. 15, 2006, at A16
(emphasis added).
50 Id.
51 K.A. Taipale, Whispering Wires and Warrantless Wiretaps: Data Mining and
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & SEC., NO. 7, SUPL. BULL. ON L. &
SEC., Spring 2006, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=889120. See also K.A. Taipale,
The Ear of Dionysus: Rethinking Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 9 YALE J. L. & TECH.
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V. THE STATUTORY ARGUMENTS
Turning now to the legal questions, after the New York
Times revealed the secret terrorist surveillance program on
December 16, 2005,52 there was an immediate outcry among
many civil libertarians.53 The administration responded six days
later with a Department of Justice letter to the majority and
ranking members of the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees,54 defending the president’s actions on statutory,
constitutional, and practical grounds.
The administration’s statutory argument rests on the
Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF),55 which Congress
passed only one week after 9/11.56 Section 2(a) of the Act
authorizes the president:
[T]o use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September
11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United
States by such nations, organizations or persons.57

At a minimum, that authorization would seem to entail the
power to obtain the foreign intelligence necessary for
accomplishing the authorization’s purpose—preventing any
future terrorist attacks on America.
The critics answered with narrow legal arguments, oblivious
it seems to the pressing practical problems the administration
faced in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, to say nothing of
possible political remedies for the critics’ concerns. Thus, their
main charge was that the AUMF could not be read as implicitly
overriding FISA’s prohibition on warrantless domestic wartime
surveillance because Congress in FISA expressly and specifically

128, 135–36 (2007) (noting, like Posner, that FISA “provides no mechanisms for
authorizing advanced technical methods” to identify terrorists).
52 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 21.
53 See, e.g., Letter from 14 self-described scholars of constitutional law and former
government officials “concerned by the Bush administration’s National Security Agency
domestic spying program” to Members of Congress (Jan. 9, 2006) available at
http://www.nsawatch.org/DOJ.Response.AUMF.final.pdf [hereinafter “Letter to Members
of Congress”]; David Cole, et al., On NSA Spying: A Letter to Congress, 53 THE N.Y. REV.
OF BOOKS 42, (Nov. 2, 2006). On its editorial page, of course, the New York Times itself
has kept up what often has seemed like a daily drumbeat of criticism of this and other
elements of the War on Terror.
54 Letter from William E. Moschella to Chairmen Roberts and Hoekstra, Vice
Chairman Rockefeller, and Ranking Member Harman (December 22, 2005) available at
http://www.nationalreview.com/pdf/12%2022%2005%20NSA%20letter.pdf.
55 Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
56 Id.
57 Id.
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addressed that issue and limited that surveillance to the first 15
days of war.58 In short, even though FISA excepts surveillance
authorized by statute, and the AUMF was later in time, an
unstated general “implication” overriding the specific and express
language of FISA cannot reasonably be drawn, critics argued, for
the law disfavors repeals by implication.59
That is generally true, of course, and were Congress to have
drafted the AUMF in the fullness of time—something it rarely
does under the best of circumstances—it would be a more
compelling argument. But in the wake of the terrorist attacks on
New York and Washington on 9/11—recall, the AUMF was
passed seven days later—Washington, even when business was
able to resume, was an armed camp, with military personnel and
equipment on every corner. The AUMF uses few words. A
natural reading of its “general” implications aside, one can only
assume that legislators did not consider every implication or
every related statute, as they might have (but only might) under
more normal circumstances.60
But if one wishes, later in time, to focus on and argue from
narrow points of statutory interpretation, the place to begin is
with a thorough and detailed rebuttal of the critics, published by
the Federalist Society.61 There the authors note, among much
else, “several reasons for concluding that one need not invalidate
FISA in order to uphold the NSA program.”62 Parsing carefully
the statutorily defined species of “electronic surveillance” that
comes within FISA’s ambit, “the range of conversations
implicated in this controversy,” they conclude, “may be much
narrower than commonly supposed.”63
This is not the forum for close discussion of the statutory
arguments, save for an additional practical consideration. The
administration’s critics have invariably assumed that a fairly
sharp line could be drawn between foreign and domestic
communications, or persons, or interceptions, when in fact that
line is often unknown and unworkable and, worst of all, would
seem to require ending the interception once it “crossed our
Letter to Members of Congress, supra note 53, at 3–4.
Id.
Still, the critics note correctly that insofar as the administration relies on a
statutory argument, it had an opportunity to obtain authorization for warrantless
surveillance when it sought and obtained amendments to FISA through the USA Patriot
Act in October 2001. Id. at n. 5.
61 See Andrew C. McCarthy, David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, NSA’s
Warrantless Surveillance Program, Legal, Constitutional, and Necessary (May 22, 2007),
available at http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20070522_terroristsurveillance.pdf.
62 Id. at 54–60.
63 Id. at 55.
58
59
60
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border”—precisely when we might most want to follow it.64
Among the absurd results that have flowed from that focus is a
recent secret decision by a FISA judge that the statute prohibited
the warrantless interception of communications between
individuals located outside the United States if the
communications passed through an Internet switch located in the
United States.65
After the decision came to light, the
administration pressed Congress strongly and obtained a
temporary fix in the form of the Protect America Act of 2007.66
VI. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
A. The Fourth Amendment
But the main weakness of the critic’s statutory argument is
circularity: it begs the basic question.
In the name of
“constitutional avoidance” it simply assumes that Congress has
the power to regulate the president’s Article II power to gather
foreign intelligence, a power presidents have exercised since the
nation’s founding, in war and peace alike, quite without any
statutory micromanagement, and with consistent judicial
deference.67 Notwithstanding that history, critics maintain that
congressional regulation of the executive’s domestic electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes is constitutional,
pointing in part to the Fourth Amendment: Congress may
regulate the president’s conduct, they say, to ensure that the
64 Greg Miller, Court Puts Limits on Surveillance Abroad, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2007,
at A16. Those who point to FISA’s emergency provisions invariably ignore what they
actually entail. As the administration has put it: “There is a serious misconception about
so-called ‘emergency authorizations’ under FISA, which allow 72 hours of surveillance
without a court order.” In particular, the attorney general must determine in advance
that the FISA application will be approved. Moreover, among other things, “a typical
FISA application involves a substantial process in its own right: The work of several
lawyers; the preparation of a legal brief and supporting declarations; the approval of a
Cabinet-level officer; a certification from the National Security Advisor, the Director of
the FBI, or another designated Senate-confirmed officer; and, finally the approval of an
Article III judge.” See Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice on The NSA Program
to Detect and Prevent Terrorist Attacks: Myth v. Reality (Jan. 27, 2006) available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/nsa_myth_v_reality.pdf. Critics often complain that
the FISA Court is a “rubber stamp.” See Del Quentin Wilber, Surveillance Court Quietly
Moving, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2009, at A2. In 2007, the last year for which statistics are
available, the court approved all but three of 2,370 applications while making substantive
modifications to 86 others. Id. But that complaint ignores the applications that were
never brought for fear of disapproval.
65 See Miller, supra note 64.
66 See The Protect America Act of 2007, supra note 24.
67 See A Tragic Legacy of Serious Harm to the Constitution and American Security
Resulting from Legislative Usurpation of Executive Power: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight of the H. Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 110th Congress 27–31 (2008) (statement of Robert F. Turner, Cofounder,
Center for National Security Law) [hereinafter “Turner, Tragic Legacy”] available at
http://www.virginia.edu/cnsl/pdf/Turner-War-Powers-in-21stCentury-April08.pdf.
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amendment’s warrant and probable cause “requirements” are
met.68
To the administration’s response that the NSA
surveillance at issue, undertaken mainly for national security
rather than for law enforcement purposes, falls under the
“special needs” exception to such requirements, critics answer
that “‘special needs’ generally excuse the warrant and
individualized suspicion requirements only where those
requirements are impracticable and the intrusion on privacy is
minimal.”69
The Fourth Amendment prohibits only “unreasonable”
searches, of course, not warrantless searches.70 But to the critics’
points: Is satisfying those warrant and individualized suspicion
“requirements” impracticable? That is a judgment call that none
but those conversant with the classified facts and practices can
make.71 To be sure, officials charged with detecting terrorist
activity have an interest in minimizing the difficulties of doing
so. But the assurances of the critics, most with no personal
acquaintance with the matter, that “the experience of FISA
shows that foreign intelligence surveillance can be carried out
through warrants based on individualized suspicion”72 does not
give confidence.73 And is the NSA’s intrusion on privacy more
than minimal? The critics’ assertion that “[w]iretapping is not a
minimal intrusion on privacy”74 would be more convincing if, as
noted earlier, they could produce people who even knew that
their communications had been intercepted, much less could
show that they had been harmed. Here again, the contrast
between the respective harms is stark—and surely must play
into the meaning of “unreasonable.”
In fact, the issue of a “special needs” exception was
addressed very recently by the United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, in only its second
opinion, In re: Directives,75 decided on August 22, 2008, but made

Letter to Members of Congress, supra note 53, at 8.
Id.
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
71 See infra notes 109–111 and the accompanying text.
72 Letter to Members of Congress, supra note 53, at 8.
73 See supra notes 49, 51, 61 and the accompanying text. Indeed, if the In re Sealed
Case, discussed infra, brought anything to light, it is how difficult and confusing it can be
for intelligence officials and courts alike to discern and apply FISA’s provisions. In re
Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam).
74 Letter to Members of Congress, supra note 53, at 8.
75 In re Directives, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008).
68
69
70

Do Not Delete

668

10/15/2009 6:15 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 12:655

public only on January 16, 2009. Ruling under provisions of the
then-recently-expired Protect America Act of 2007, which had
temporarily revised FISA,76 the court held that “a foreign
intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement exists when surveillance is conducted to obtain
foreign intelligence for national security purposes and is directed
against foreign powers or agents of foreign powers reasonably
believed to be located outside the United States.”77 Moreover,
after considering the totality of the circumstances and balancing
the relevant interests, the court also held “that the surveillances
at issue satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness
requirement.”78
B. The Separation of Powers
Congressional regulation pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment is only one branch of the constitutional argument, of
course. More fundamental, arguably, is the separation-of-powers
issue. And here, it should be noticed, the critics’ push for
congressional dominance in foreign affairs is but part of a much
larger trend, stretching back over more than a century. Today’s
congressional supremacists see a broad scope for legislation in
foreign affairs, which means, ultimately, for adjudication by the
courts—in short, for the judicialization of war, promoted today
largely by the international law branch of the legal academy.79
But that development did not begin with foreign affairs. Its roots
are in the Progressive Era, with an emphasis on the statutory
ordering of domains the Constitution had left largely to private
ordering, albeit with judicial oversight under the common law.80
That Progressive vision was finally constitutionalized by the New
Deal Court, which is seen by many today, erroneously, as having
checked the “activism” of the “Old Court.”81 In truth, however,
the New Deal Court opened the floodgates for a surfeit of
Progressive legislation—federal, state, and local—regulating vast
areas of life, following which the courts were increasingly called

See The Protect America Act of 2007, supra note 24.
In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1012.
Id. at 1016.
See David D. Cole, Rights over Borders: Transnational Constitutionalism and
Guantanamo Bay, 2007–2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 47, 51, 60; cf. Eric A. Posner,
Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 2007–2008 CATO SUP.
CT. REV. 23, 44–6. For a critique of the move from traditional liberal internationalism to
progressive transnationalism, see John Fonte, The World Is My Constituency, NATIONAL
REVIEW, Nov. 2, 2008 available at http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
publication_details&id=5852.
80 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION 2–8
(2006).
81 Id. at 71–77.
76
77
78
79
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upon to adjudicate the often inconsistent and incoherent
legislative tangle that poured through.82
With the Vietnam War, however, we saw that same
Progressive impulse directed to foreign affairs. Between 1964
and 1984, for example, the congressional publication Legislation
on Foreign Relations increased four-fold, from one 659-page
volume to two volumes of over 1,300 pages each.83 It was a
massive expansion of congressional micromanagement of the
executive’s conduct of foreign affairs, no better illustrated than
by the War Powers Resolution (1973) and FISA (1978).84
Not surprisingly, those who argue for congressional
supremacy in foreign affairs usually ignore the early sources
cited above. Instead, they take as their template the 1952
concurrence of Justice Robert Jackson in the Youngstown case,85
which in their hands has achieved all but iconic status. Recall
that Jackson distinguished three scenarios: the president’s power
is at its height when supported by congressional action, he said;
in a “zone of twilight” when Congress is silent; and “at its lowest
ebb” when at odds with the expressed or implied will of
Congress.86
82 I have discussed those issues more fully in Guns and Butter: Setting Priorities in
Federal Spending in the Context of Natural Disasters, Deficits, and War: Hearing Before
the Comm. on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Subcomm. on Fed. Financial
Management, Government Information, and International Security, United States S.,
109th Cong. (statement of Roger Pilon, Vice President for Legal Affairs, B. Kenneth
Simon Chair in Constitutional Studies, and Director, Center for Constitutional Studies,
Cato Institute), available at http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-rp102005.html, reprinted as
The United States Constitution: From Limited Government to Leviathan, A.I.E.R.
ECONOMIC EDUCATION BULLETIN, 2005.
83 COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, LEGISLATION ON FOREIGN RELATIONS THROUGH 1964 (1964); COMM.
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, LEGISLATION ON FOREIGN RELATIONS THROUGH 1984 (1984).
84 See Turner, Tragic Legacy, supra note 67.
In the aftermath of the 1960s, congressional intrusion into matters the Constitution left
mainly to politics was not limited to foreign affairs, of course. Another area that has seen
congressional micromanagement, with predictable consequences, is campaign finance.
See, e.g. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3; Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443. 88 Stat. 1263;
Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116
Stat. 81. At oral argument in a case now before the Supreme Court, Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission, former solicitor general Theodore B. Olson, arguing for the
petitioner, described the current law as “one of the most complicated, expensive, and
incomprehensible regulatory regimes ever invented by the administrative state”—a
regime that Deputy Solicitor General Malcolm Stewart, arguing for the government, later
admitted would allow for the regulation not only of the movie at issue but of books as well.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, 37, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
No. 08-205, March 24, 2009, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/08-205.pdf.
85 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
86 Id. at 637.
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There are several problems with using that template as a
substitute for the Constitution as originally understood and as
interpreted and applied by the courts over the years to foreign
affairs. First, Youngstown was arguably a domestic, not a foreign
affairs, case, notwithstanding President Truman’s effort to
bootstrap a local labor dispute into a foreign affairs matter.
Second, Jackson’s concurrence was the opinion of only one
justice.87 Third, it was dicta. Fourth, it was metaphor. Fifth,
even on its own terms the passage did not say that the president
did not have power; it said only that his power was “at its lowest
ebb,”88 which is a political, not a legal, point. Finally, Jackson
carefully distinguished the seizure of private property within the
United States from a case involving external affairs, noting
expressly that the president’s “conduct of foreign affairs” was
“largely uncontrolled, and often even is unknown,” by the other
branches.89 And he added: “I should indulge the widest latitude
of interpretation to sustain [the president’s] exclusive function to
command the instruments of national force, at least when turned
against the outside world for the security of our society.”90
Administration critics also cite the so-called Keith case of
1972.91 But that too was a domestic case. And the Court there
repeatedly distinguished it from one involving the president’s
constitutional power to collect foreign intelligence.92 Writing for
an unanimous Court, Justice Lewis Powell quoted from the
wiretap provisions of the 1968 Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act:93
Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the
Communications Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 1143; 47 U.S.C. 605) shall limit
the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he
deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential
attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign
intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United
States, or to protect national security information against foreign
intelligence activities.94

But, critics respond, “FISA specifically repealed that
provision, FISA § 201(c), 92 Stat. 1797, and replaced it with
language dictating that FISA and the criminal code are the

87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Id. at 642.
Id. at 637.
Id. at 642.
Id. at 645 (emphasis added).
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
Id.
Id. at 303.
Id.
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‘exclusive means’ of conducting electronic surveillance.”95
Clearly, Congress can repeal that provision. Consistent with the
separation of powers, however, it cannot, by mere statute, repeal
or otherwise restrict “the constitutional power of the President”—
a power it had recently recognized—by “dictating” how the
president shall exercise his constitutional power.
To be sure, Article I, section 8 of the Constitution vests
power in Congress “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution” the powers vested in the
government, including the power of the president to gather
foreign intelligence.96
But FISA is hardly “necessary” for
carrying that power into execution—presidents have exercised it
since the nation’s inception, quite without any congressional
micromanagement.
Nor is FISA “proper” insofar as its
restrictions intrude on the president’s vested foreign affairs
powers or hinder his protection of the nation for so little gain—
both of which, unfortunately, are the case.
Those conclusions emerged in various ways in the most
authoritative opinion to date on FISA, post 9/11 and post Patriot
Act, the In re: Sealed Case,97 decided on November 18, 2002, by
the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review—its first decision since FISA was enacted.98 Although
the government was not bringing an Article II challenge to FISA,
it was seeking reversal of the lower FISA court’s grant of a
surveillance order that imposed restrictions on the internal
workings of the Justice Department, restrictions that arose, the
court of review found, from several erroneous readings of the
statute by prior courts.99 But in the course of its exhaustive
opinion, the court of review spoke directly to the issue of inherent
(more properly, vested100) executive power.101 Citing an earlier
Fourth Circuit decision, United States v. Truong,102 which dealt
with pre-FISA surveillance based on “the President’s
constitutional responsibility to conduct the foreign affairs of the
United States,”103 the court said:
The Truong court, as did all the other courts to have decided the issue,
held that the President did have inherent authority to conduct

Letter to Members of Congress, supra note 53, at 6 (original emphasis).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
In re: Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curium).
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 See Lawson, supra note 48.
101 In re: Sealed Case was also cited repeatedly in the second opinion of the FISA
Court of Review, In re Directives, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2009).
102 United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d. 908, 911 (4th Cir. 1980).
103 In re: Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 742.
95
96
97
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warrantless searches to obtain foreign intelligence information . . . We
take for granted that the President does have that authority and,
assuming that is so, FISA could not encroach on the President’s
constitutional power.104

That does not settle the separation-of-powers question, of
course, for it leaves open the relation, in various factual
situations, between the president’s and Congress’s concurrent
powers. But it points in the right direction by noting the
unmistakable history of judicial support for the president’s
“inherent authority to conduct warrantless searches to obtain
foreign intelligence information.”105 In deciding the issue before
it, however, the Sealed Case court’s main concern was with how
there arose a “false dichotomy” between surveillance for foreign
intelligence purposes and surveillance for law enforcement
purposes—leading to the “primary purpose” test for admitting
evidence into criminal prosecutions—and how that led in turn to
a “wall” between law enforcement and counterintelligence agents
and agencies.106 In painstaking detail the court traces those
errors.107 Yet the inescapable conclusion that emerges from that
troubled history is really quite simple: How could it have been
otherwise?
VII. CONGRESSIONAL OVERREACHING AND POLITICS
The complex layers of confusion the Sealed Case court lays
bare—among prior courts and government officials alike—is the
product, quite simply, of repeated efforts by Congress to “get it
right.” But in a matter so fraught with infinite variety as foreign
intelligence gathering, in a world of ever changing technology,
statutory micromanagement of the kind revealed in Sealed Case
is a fool’s errand. Classical economists like F.A. Hayek have
demonstrated the folly of legislative efforts to manage the
economy—the kinds of efforts that emerged from Congress with
the New Deal.108 Mutatis mutandis, the same principles apply
here. All of which brings us back, not surprisingly, to John
Locke: the foreign affairs power “is much less capable to be
directed by antecedent, standing, positive Laws, than [by] the
Executive; and so must necessarily be left to the Prudence and
Wisdom of those whose hands it is in, to be managed for the
publick [sic] good.”109
104
105
106
107
108

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
See Id.
See Id.
See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. J., 519 (Sept.

109

Locke, supra note 25.

1945).
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And recent experience bears that out. Recall the Senate
testimony of former FBI agent Coleen Rowley, based in the FBI’s
Minneapolis office, about the difficulties she encountered with
FBI headquarters agents who feared she did not have enough
evidence to obtain a FISA warrant to search the laptop of
Zacarias Moussaoui, later convicted as the twentieth 9/11
hijacker.110 And at Moussaoui’s trial, four years later, Rowley’s
former colleague, FBI agent Harry Samit, testified that only days
before 9/11 he tried to get a FISA warrant to search Moussaoui’s
laptop, only to be told that he didn’t have enough to satisfy the
FISA restrictions.111 When FISA was enacted, Congress decided
to err on the side of privacy, not security, and we paid the price
for it.
None of this is to say, of course, that Congress is powerless
in these matters. In foreign affairs in general it has certain
enumerated constitutional powers that historically have checked
the executive in limited ways. Most prominently, it has the
power of the purse—and, ultimately, the power of impeachment.
But short of those, it has the political power that is inherent in
its oversight functions, whether conducted in public or, as is
often necessary in these matters, in closed sessions. When
Congress tries to micromanage the executive through legislation,
however, it is the courts that often end up doing the
micromanaging, indulging the judicial hermeneutics we see in so
many of these cases, trying to discern what Congress “really”
meant, issuing fractured opinions and inscrutable guidance over
matters beyond their competence. The In re: Sealed Case
illustrates the struggle: it shows, beyond doubt, how earlier
courts, doing the same, led to the erection of the “wall” that may
have led, tragically, to the terrorist attacks of September 11.112

110 Oversight Hearing on Counterterrorism: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/
testimony.cfm?id=279&wit_id=628 (statement of Coleen Rowley, Federal Bureau of
Investigation agent).
111 Transcript of Record at 907–51, United States v. Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220 (2007),
available at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/moussaoui/zmsamit.html
(last visited July 16, 2009).
112 See In re: Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, n.29 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curium):
An FBI agent recently testified that efforts to conduct a criminal investigation
of two of the alleged hijackers were blocked by senior FBI officials—
understandably concerned about prior FISA court criticisms—who interpreted
that court’s decisions as precluding a criminal investigator’s role. One agent,
frustrated at encountering the “wall,” wrote to headquarters: “[S]omeday
someone will die—and wall or not—the public will not understand why we
were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain
‘problems.’ Let’s hope the National Security Law Unit will stand behind their
decisions then, especially since the biggest threat to us now, [Usama Bin
Laden], is getting the most ‘protection.’” The agent was told in response that
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In the end, as the Framers understood, foreign affairs, with
all its variables and subtleties, is more a matter for politics than
law. Early on, in secret sessions, President Bush briefed eight
key members of Congress about the Terrorist Surveillance
Program, to the apparent satisfaction of all. It was only after
details of the program were leaked to the press, more than three
years later, that opinions shifted. Still, as politics have played
out since then, opinion has shifted again as cooler heads have
come to the fore. On July 10, 2008, President Bush signed The
FISA Amendments Law of 2008, which members of Congress,
including
then
Senator
Barack
Obama,
supported
overwhelmingly.113
Whether those amendments, which
substantially loosen FISA’s restrictions on the president’s foreign
intelligence surveillance power, will survive the test of time in an
ever-changing world remains to be seen. But a history of
repeated revisions suggests that the Framers got it right when
they left such matters mainly to the president and politics.

headquarters was frustrated with the issue, but that those were the rules, and
the National Security Law Unit does not make them up. The Malaysia
Hijacking and September 11th: Joint Hearing Before the Senate and House
Select Intelligence Committees (Sept. 20, 2002) (written statement of New York
special agent of the FBI).
113 H.R.
6304:
FISA
Amendments
Act
of
2008,
available
at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-6304;
See
Michael
Hayden,
Warrantless Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2009, at A21:
Some critics claim that Congress was not aware of the full extent of the
program, but the ultimate judgment on the effectiveness of much of the
program may actually have been the actions of Congress. In the 2008
amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Congress judged it
appropriate not only to provide additional legal underpinnings for much of
what the agency had been doing but also to recognize the value of its activities
by providing additional critically needed capabilities. In my briefings to
Congressional overseers from 2001 to 2005, I continually made the point that
we simply could not achieve the program’s operational effect under FISA
procedures as they then existed and it is clear that Congress ultimately agreed.

